Cortical competition: a neurally plausible account of hemisphere-specific processing resources? by Clevenger, John H
CORTICAL COMPETITION: A NEURALLY PLAUSIBLE ACCOUNT OF 
HEMISPHERE-SPECIFIC PROCESSING RESOURCES?
BY
JOHN CLEVENGER
THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016
Urbana, Illinois
Master’s Committee:
Professor Diane Beck, Chair
Professor Dan Simons
ii
ABSTRACT
Recent studies have shown performance advantages in visual tasks when task-relevant 
stimuli are presented in different visual hemifields as opposed to a single hemifield. A common 
interpretation of these findings is that each cortical hemisphere has an independent tank of 
processing resources and that overloading a single hemisphere leads to performance degradation. 
However, it is not clear what such processing resources might be. We explore three ways of 
interpreting processing resources and their relationship to hemifield independence: resources as a 
kind of neural fuel, as a limitation on the coordination of attentional deployment, and as 
competition (interference) between representations in visual cortex. We report three experiments 
centered on hemifield independence that provide constraints on each of the three models. 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that, while fixing hemifield-level display density, local display 
density seems to drive hemifield independence. We argue that the competition model a priori 
predicts this effect and offer suggestions for how the other models can be adapted to account for 
it. Experiment 3 shows that hemifield independence can be modulated by attention: when the 
location of target is validly cued hemifield independence disappears. Once again, this effect is 
predicted by the competition model but is not inconsistent with the other two models. Taken as a 
whole, we argue that these three experiments provide constraints on any successful explanation 
of hemifield independence and suggest that the competition model naturally satisfies these 
constraints.
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11.  Introduction
A number of studies have shown surprising and significant performance advantages when 
task-relevant stimuli are spread across both the left and right visual hemifields as opposed to 
when the same stimuli appear within a single hemifield (Sereno & Kosslyn, 1991; Awh & 
Pashler, 2000; Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005; Delvenne, 2005 ; Scalf et al., 2007). One study 
(Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005), for instance, found that spreading objects into both hemifields 
effectively doubled the number of objects that participants could track. This dramatic asymmetry 
in processing capacity due to hemifield placement (which has been called hemifield 
independence) has important implications for models of attention and working memory, as well 
as practical applications (e.g., how to represent information to improve processing capacity). 
Understanding the cognitive and neural underpinnings of hemifield independence can thus 
inform both theory and application.
However, despite a wealth of data demonstrating hemifield independence as a behavioral 
phenomenon, tractable cognitive and neural explanations remain elusive. There is general 
agreement that hemifield independence arises due to independent processing resources in each 
cortical hemisphere (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005; Franconeri & Alvarez, 2007; Alvarez, 
Gill, & Cavanagh, 2012). Since the left and right visual hemifields project to contralateral 
cortical hemispheres, displaying items across hemifields thus spreads the visual load across two 
hemispheres (and two processors). Conversely, putting items into a single visual hemifield 
concentrates the visual load onto a single processor, increasing the difficulty of the task. While 
this hemifield-specific processing resources account seems to fit much of the behavioral data 
well, the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie it remain relatively unspecified. Our 
2goal here is to outline a neural mechanism that we believe can inform and constrain cognitive-
level explanations of hemifield independence. 
In what follows we compare three explanations of hemifield independence: a resource 
model, an attentional-control model, and a competition model. Each of these models explains 
hemifield independence by reference to different processing bottlenecks. The resource model 
conceptualizes attention as a kind of processing fuel (Kahneman 1973; Lavie, 1995; Franconeri 
& Alvarez, 2007) and explains capacity limits as due to the depletion of attention. The 
attentional-control model explains hemifield independence as the result of capacity limits in the 
coordination of attentional deployment (Alvarez, Gill, & Cavanagh, 2012). The competition 
model claims that within-hemifield processing limitations may result from local interference 
between representations in visual cortex (Sereno & Kosslyn, 1991; Scalf & Beck, 2010; Scalf, 
Torralbo, Tapia, & Beck, 2013; Clevenger & Beck, 2014; Cohen, Rhee, & Alvarez, 2016).
1.1 The Resource Model
Attention is often conceptualized as a capacity limited fuel or resource that is necessary 
for the visual system to construct the objects of experience (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Visual 
processing bottlenecks thus arise when the processing requirements (load) of a task exceed the 
amount of available attentional resources. Lavie and colleagues have crystallized this logic into a 
theory of attention (Lavie, 1995; Lavie, 2005) that explains both early and late selection as a 
result of the availability of attentional resources: when perceptual load is low, all stimuli are fully 
processed because attentional resources are available, however when perceptual load is high 
attention is depleted and some stimuli are filtered out at an early stage. Because Lavie’s theory 
conceptualizes attention as a global processing resource, hemifield independence appears to be 
3incompatible with it. However, others have argued for something like a hemifield-specific 
version of this theory where each hemisphere possesses its own finite pool of resources that are 
necessary to process stimuli (Friedman & Polson, 1981; Friedman, Polson, Dafoe, & Gaskill, 
1982; LaBerge & Brown, 1989; Sereno & Kosslyn, 1991; Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2005; Delvenne 
& Holt, 2012). When the processing load of some task exceeds a hemisphere’s available 
resources, that hemisphere becomes overtaxed and processing capacity suffers. Spreading a task 
across two hemispheres in such cases can reduce the load on any single hemisphere, thus 
alleviating processing bottlenecks and improving capacity. This model thereby provides a natural 
and intuitive explanation for hemifield independence in terms of the independent availability of 
processing resources across hemispheres.
However, it is not entirely clear what the resource model is supposed to be a model of. If 
taken literally, as a model of the implementational details of attention, it does not accord with the 
extant neuroscience literature. The resource model as implementation appears to posit something 
like neural fuel: actual, physical resources in the brain that are produced, distributed, and 
depleted. Currently, however, there are no plausible neural candidates for such fuel. As Scalf et 
al. (2013) note, while depletion of metabolites like glucose and oxygen may, in cases of extreme 
deficiency, explain some cognitive limitations, there is not much evidence that the capacity 
limits observed in normal conditions are caused by resource exhaustion. Without evidence for a 
plausible neural mechanism, the resource model as implementation is purely speculative. 
Further, the explanatory work that the resource model as implementation can do is quite limited 
without either a plausible mechanism or some way to measure resource-demand independently 
of behavioral costs. While the model does provide a potential explanation for why, in general, 
adding more stuff for people to simultaneously process degrades behavioral performance, it does 
4not explain why this is not always true. In some cases, like pop-out visual search or displays in 
which stimuli can be grouped in meaningful ways, adding more stuff does not seem to degrade 
behavior much at all (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). These examples are exceptions to normal 
behavioral patterns, of course, and while the resource model can be made consistent with them it 
does not offer theoretical machinery rich enough to predict them. The concern is that if we 
cannot make substantive predictions about where and when capacity limits due to resource 
exhaustion will occur, our resource becomes just a synonym for difficulty. 
Despite this, as noted, we are not suggesting that the resource model is devoid of value. 
We instead argue that resources are better (and perhaps typically) understood as a description of 
general behavioral regularities, a functional-level explanation, rather than a story of 
implementation. However, the resource model as functional explanation suffers from the same 
explanatory limitations just mentioned. Since the model is really just a description of behavioral 
regularities (an empirical generalization) it does not provide any theoretical machinery to predict 
deviations from those regularities (e.g., hemifield independence). Partly because it is agnostic to 
implemenational details, the resource model as functional explanation can be made consistent 
with any of the three models here under consideration (what it sacrifices in prediction it makes 
up for in pliability). As such, we do not consider the functional interpretation of the resources 
model in depth in this paper. Rather, we consider whether the resource model could be a model 
of implementation.
1.2 The Attentional-Control Model
In contrast to the resource model, the attentional-control model explains hemifield 
independence as arising from capacity restrictions on the deployment of attention to multiple 
5locations within a hemifield (Alvarez et al., 2012). This explanation is based on the observation 
that the parietal and frontal areas that subserve the deployment of spatial attention to visual 
cortex primarily respond to a single hemifield (Bruce & Goldberg, 1985). Because of this, the 
thinking goes, it might be possible that these attentional-control areas have independent 
capacities for deploying attention into the separate hemispheres. When multiple stimuli project to 
two hemifields these areas can coordinate the deployment of attention to each hemisphere more 
efficiently than if the same stimuli shared a hemifield. Importantly, especially in contrast to the 
competition model below, the attentional-control model places the processing bottleneck 
explaining hemifield independence at the level of the control processes that deploy and 
coordinate attention. This implies that hemifield-independence arises because of our inability to 
efficiently deploy attention where it is needed. This is similar to the resource model explanation 
where capacity limits arise because of a lack, or absence, of attention. In both cases, if enough 
attention were available and/or able to be efficiently deployed, processing bottlenecks (capacity 
limits) would be alleviated. However, as discussed below, previous work (Scalf & Beck, 2010) 
has shown that processing bottlenecks can arise even when attention is fully engaged on the to be 
processed stimuli.
Despite this, the attentional-control model is an attractive theoretical refinement of the 
resource model insofar as it provides a falsifiable neural locus for the processing bottlenecks that 
lead to hemifield independence. There is also data showing that activity in the posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) appears to track attentional load (Mitchell & Cusak, 2008; Xu & Chun, 2009; Scalf 
& Beck, 2010). However, we are not aware of any data showing that hemispheric asymmetries in 
the parietal cortex might actually explain hemifield independence. Scalf and Beck, 2010, 
investigated parietal contributions to hemifield independence and failed to find any differences in 
6PPC activity between unilateral and bilateral deployments of attention. It is therefore still an 
open question how, if at all, attentional-control areas contribute to hemifield independence.
1.3 The Competition Model
Lastly, we suggest that there might already be a neurally plausible explanation for 
hemifield independence in the literature: competition (interference) between representations in 
adjacent areas of cortex. Competition between representations in cortex is known to be an 
important bandwidth limitation on our ability to process visual input. When multiple objects 
project to similar areas of the brain they interact in a mutually suppressive way, degrading each 
other’s neural representations (Moran & Desimone, 1985; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Luck et 
al., 1997; Kastner et al., 1998). This can occur when multiple objects fall into the receptive field 
of the same neuron; in such cases the neuron appears to respond with a weighted average of the 
responses evoked by each item in isolation (Reynolds et al., 1999; Zoccolan et al., 2005), 
resulting in a response that signals neither item clearly. Degradation can also occur when 
multiple objects fall into the non-overlapping receptive fields of separate, but cortically adjacent, 
neurons (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009; Carandini & Heeger, 2012). Neurons in visual cortex are 
densely connected to their neighbors, and those connections may form a suppressive field: an 
area of the visual field in which the presence of other objects suppresses a neuron’s firing. This is 
thought to occur because an individual neuron’s response to an object is dependent upon 
(normalized to) the responses of its neighboring neurons (Reynolds & Heeger, 2009; Carandini 
& Heeger, 2012). This means that a neuron’s response to a single object can be dramatically 
degraded when that object appears close to, and is suppressed by, other stimuli (Rolls, 
Aggelopoulos, & Zheng, 2003; Bles, Schwarzbach, De Weerd, Goebel, & Jansma, 2006; 
7Torralbo & Beck, 2008; Parks, Beck, & Kramer, 2013). This increases processing difficulty and 
reduces performance for tasks like detection, recognition, and tracking (Andriessen & Bouma, 
1976; Polat & Sagi, 1993; Kastner, de Weerd, Desimone, Ungerleider, 1998; Reynolds, Chelazzi 
& Desimone, 1999; Petrov, Carandini, & McKee, 2005). We suggest that this simple and well-
researched neural mechanism might provide a neural explanation for the behavioral evidence of 
hemifield independence.
Because of the anatomical separation of the hemispheres, neurons in one hemisphere are 
not locally connected to neurons in the other hemisphere (Schmidt, 2013). Together with the 
contralateral organization of visual cortex (Golomb & Kanwisher, 2011), these facts mean that 
multiple objects falling close together within a visual hemifield strongly compete with one 
another, mutually suppressing one another’s representations. However, when multiple objects 
fall across hemifields they are cortically isolated from one another, at least in early to 
intermediate visual areas, and do not strongly compete. So the idea is that separating stimuli into 
different hemifields reduces task difficulty and improves processing capacity, but it does so by 
reducing competitive interactions (interference) between representations resulting in a clearer 
representation of the stimuli. According to this account, hemifield independence might result not 
from depletion of resources or constrained attentional deployment, but from greater competition 
in unilateral as opposed to bilateral presentations.
The competition model suggests a different account of processing bottlenecks and 
capacity limits than either the resource or attentional-control models. As mentioned above, these 
models explain processing bottlenecks as arising from a lack of attention, either because 
attention has been physically used up or because control systems cannot efficiently coordinate its 
deployment. In contrast, the competition model suggests that processing bottlenecks arise when 
8representations actively interfere with one another. Thus, these processing bottlenecks are not the 
product of top-down attention, per se, but of the “wiring” of the brain (however as we will see 
below attention does interact with these mechanisms in important ways). This account of 
processing bottlenecks is conceptually different from the “lack of attention” accounts of the 
resource and attentional-control models. It also makes an interesting prediction: if multiple 
stimuli are represented in an area of the brain where they strongly interact, attending equally to 
both stimuli may not improve their representations because attention has not reduced the ability 
of the stimuli to interfere with each other (Scalf & Beck, 2010). Adding attention, then, does not 
alleviate the bottleneck because the bottleneck is not caused by a lack of attention. This is 
discussed more in the general discussion.
In short, the competition model of hemifield independence has a number of advantages 
over both the resource and attentional-control models. First, it is a neurally plausible mechanism 
for which researchers have accumulated a vast array of evidence across a number of 
methodologies (e.g., single cell recordings, ERP, fMRI, behavioral). Second, the model does 
explanatory work. It integrates the behavioral data with a well-understood neural mechanism, 
producing clear, novel predictions about when the effect should occur that conflict with the 
predictions of the other two models under consideration. The experiments we discuss below 
tested two of these predictions.
In Experiment 1, we had participants search a briefly-displayed array for one of two 
targets. The display was asymmetrically organized such that three objects always appeared in 
one visual hemifield and a single object always appeared in the other (as in Torralbo & Beck, 
2008) (see Figure 1). We varied whether the target was the sole object in a hemifield or whether 
it shared a hemifield with non-targets. We operationalized hemifield independence as the extent 
9to which performance was better when the target was alone in a hemifield relative to when it 
shared a hemifield with non-targets. We crossed the hemifield manipulation with an overall 
display-density manipulation, where the target appeared either near to or far from the non-
targets. Critically, the competition model predicts that hemifield independence should only occur 
when items are close enough to strongly compete with one another. Importantly, both the 
resource and attentional-control models predict no differences in hemifield independence 
between density conditions because the total number of objects per hemifield is held constant. 
We note that both the resource and the attentional-control models could be made consistent with 
a display-density effect by either theoretical augmentation or by positing a theoretically-external 
mechanism like crowding (though it is not clear whether crowding, a behavioral regularity, and 
competition, a neural mechanism, are independent). However, the competition model a priori 
predicts a display-density effect.
In Experiment 3, we tested an implication of the competition model concerning the effect 
of attentional cueing on hemifield independence. Attending to an object has been shown to 
increase the fidelity of its representation and to reduce the suppressive influences of its 
competitors (Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001; 
Reynolds & Heeger, 2009; Yeshurun & Rashal, 2010). Attention thus biases the competition 
between targets and non-targets, causing the target to become well-represented and the non-
targets to be suppressed. In other words, attention appears to alter neural computations such that 
neurons switch from computing an average representation of multiple objects to computing a 
winner-take-all representation of the attended object (Reynolds et al., 1999; Carandini & Heeger, 
2012). According to the competition model, then, when multiple objects are densely arranged 
within a hemifield, attending to one of them should reduce or eliminate the suppressive 
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influences of the others, thereby reducing or eliminating any performance benefit for spreading 
the objects over two hemifields. Importantly, the same prediction should not be made by a basic 
resource model in which the term resource is used synonymously with attention. Cueing 
attention to one of multiple objects in one hemifield should have little effect on an independent 
resource in the other hemisphere. Thus, whether it is cued or not, the visual system should have a 
greater capacity to represent information in two separate hemifields than in a single hemifield. 
Similarly, the attentional-control model should also predict no cue-based differences in hemifield 
independence; regardless of whether a location is cued, the number of within- and between-
hemifield objects to be selected remains the same.
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2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we had participants complete a visual search task while we varied both 
the number of objects with which a target shared a hemifield and overall display-density. When 
objects are densely arranged and fall within the same hemifield they can strongly compete with 
one another (Kastner et al., 1998), but densely arranged objects that fall into different hemifields 
are cortically isolated and so are not subject to same competitive interactions (Torralbo & Beck, 
2008). The competition model thus predicts greater hemifield independence when display-
density is high and less when display-density is low. When multiple objects within a hemifield 
are sparsely arranged, it is less likely that a neuron’s response to an object will be suppressed by 
the other objects in that hemifield (Kastner, De Weerd, Pinsk, Elizondo, Desimone, & 
Ungerleider, 2001; Bles, et al., 2006). This is because neurons are densely connected to their 
nearest neighbors and more sparsely connected to cortically distant neurons (Schmidt 2013). The 
competition model thus predicts that separating densely-arranged objects within a hemifield 
should have a similar effect as separating objects across hemifields: both manipulations should 
increase the cortical distance between objects and reduce competition between them. It is less 
clear what the resource and attentional-control models would predict here. As specified, neither 
model provides the theoretical apparatus to predict that display-density should have an impact on 
hemifield independence. However, it is possible that both models could be augmented to account 
for such effects (as discussed below).
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2.1 Methods
Participants 
Sample size was determined by emulating a pilot experiment that we conducted that had a 
similar manipulation and post hoc power of .8. Twelve participants were recruited from the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in exchange for course credit. All twelve gave 
informed consent and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were 
comfortably seated 57 cm (chinrest enforced) from a 24-inch LCD monitor set to a refresh rate of 
100 Hz.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
The stimuli consisted of seven images of animals on white backgrounds (Konkle, Brady, 
Alvarez, & Oliva, 2010) that subtended 1.1° x 1.1° of visual angle. Two of the images were 
dogs, two were birds, one a horse, one a butterfly, and one a turtle. On each trial, participants 
saw a black dot at fixation on a white screen for 300 - 500 ms. Four images were then displayed 
in the periphery, briefly (200 ms) to control for eye-movements. One of the four images (the 
target) was always either a bird or a dog, whereas the other three images (the non-targets) were a 
horse, a butterfly, and a turtle. Participants were told that each trial contained a single target 
image: either a bird or a dog. They were told to covertly search the display and indicate as 
quickly as possible via keypress which target category was present. Trials without responses 
were terminated after 2500 ms and marked incorrect. Participants completed 64 practice trials 
and 4 blocks of 64 experimental trials.
On each trial, four items were arranged in a configuration such that one of the two lateral 
positions appeared in a different visual hemifield than the other three images (Figure 1). Targets 
could appear in one of these two lateral positions, and both positions were equidistant (4.2°) 
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from fixation and from the non-targets. The orientation of the configuration was counterbalanced 
such that each hemifield condition could appear in both the left and right hemifields and the 
location was also counterbalanced such that the entire configuration could appear in both the 
upper and lower visual fields. In half of the trials, the target appeared alone in a visual hemifield 
and in the other half of the trials the target shared a hemifield with non-targets. Since neurons in 
early-to-intermediate visual areas are densely connected within cortical hemispheres and not 
across hemispheres (Schmidt 2013), we expected this hemifield manipulation to modulate 
competition between the target and non-targets when the items were close enough to compete 
with one another (Torralbo & Beck, 2008; Liu, Jiang, Sun, & He, 2009; Scalf & Beck, 2010).
We crossed the hemifield manipulation with a display-density manipulation. In half of the 
trials, the target was centered close enough (2.2°) to the two adjacent non-targets that we 
expected strong competition in early-to-intermediate visual cortex when the items shared a 
hemifield (Kastner et al, 1998; Kastner, De Weerd, Pinsk, Elizondo, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 
2001). In the other half of trials, the target was centered far enough away (4.4°) from the non-
targets that we expected relatively little competition in early-to-intermediate visual areas 
(Kastner, De Weerd, Pinsk, Elizondo, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2001, Bles, et al., 2006).
2.2 Results and Discussion
Mean reaction times (RTs) and error rates were calculated for each participant in each 
combination of hemifield and density conditions (Figure 2). We designed the experiment to test 
RTs (participants were told to prioritize RTs) so were restricted our statistical tests to RTs. 
However, the error rates show no evidence of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (Table 1). We had one 
main prediction: that we would find hemifield independence when the objects were close enough 
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to strongly compete with one another (when density was high) and not when the objects were far 
enough apart that they would not strongly compete with one another (when density was low). We 
investigated this prediction with three tests that directly tested our prediction. We did not 
conduct a 2-way ANOVA followed by t-tests, as is often done in 2 x 2 factorial designs, because 
we were not interested in two of the three tests that constitute an ANOVA and did not want to 
unnecessarily increase our false positive rate (Cramer, Ravenzwaaij, Matzke, Steingroever, 
Wetzels, Grasman, Waldorp, & Wagenmakers, 2015). Instead, we directly tested our prediction 
with three two-tailed, within-subjects t-tests, and used a sequential Bonferroni to correct for 
multiple comparisons (see Cramer et al., 2015 for the corrected thresholds mentioned below).
All three models predict hemifield independence in the high density displays, such that 
RTs should be faster when the target is presented alone in the hemifield than when the target 
shares a hemifield with non-targets; in the parlance of the resource model, when there are fewer 
(alone) as opposed to more items in a hemifield (shared). When density was high, performance 
was indeed worse (participants were slower to find the target) when the target shared a hemifield 
with non-targets (M = 652.92 ms, SD = 142.89 ms) than when the target was alone in a hemifield 
(M = 629.28, SD = 118.64 ms), t(11) = 3.71, p = .003, 95% CI [11.312, 44.363], Cohen’s dz = 
1.070. This result is significant at the corrected alpha threshold of .05.
Importantly, as predicted by the competition model, we found greater hemifield 
independence (here operationalized as the difference in RTs between when the target was 
isolated in a hemifield and RTs when the target shared a hemifield with non-targets) when 
density was high (M = 23.64 ms, SD = 29.11 ms ) than when density was low (M = -8.7 ms, SD 
= 19.22 ms), t(11) = 3.16, p = .009, 95% CI [9.81, 54.87], Cohen’s dz = .912. This result is 
significant at the corrected alpha threshold of .025. As mentioned above, it is not entirely clear 
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what the resource and attentional-control models predict here. Taken at face value, neither model 
predicts that display-density should matter for hemifield independence, but that may be because 
the models are underspecified or that there is some theoretically-external mechanism at play. 
This suggests that the models could be augmented to account for this data (though importantly 
the competition model predicts this data a priori). For example, the resource model could posit 
localized resources that are differentially exhausted when too many stimuli occupy a localized 
set of neurons. Similarly, the attentional-control model could be modified to place another 
bottleneck in attentional coordination at a level lower than the hemifield (e.g., the receptive 
field). It would therefore be able to account for display-density effects and would move 
theoretically closer to the competition model. These options will be discussed more in the 
general discussion.
Finally, the competition model does not predict hemifield independence when density is 
low, and we found no evidence of hemifield independence. When density was low, performance 
was not worse when the target shared a hemifield with non-targets (M = 616.38 ms, SD = 121.40 
ms) than when the target appeared alone in a hemifield (M = 625.08, SD = 123.95 ms), t(11) = -
1.29, p = .223, 95% CI [-34.903, 9.103], Cohen’s dz = -.373. This result was not significant at 
the corrected alpha threshold of .017.
In sum, our data are consistent with the predictions of the competition model: reducing 
the number of objects in a hemifield improved performance only when those objects were close 
enough to strongly compete with one another. When objects were spread farther apart it did not 
matter how many appeared in the same hemifield. In other words, hemifield independence 
occurred only when competition between objects was strong and disappeared when competition 
was minimal.
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3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we found evidence for the competition model in terms of increased 
search times. The idea is that a target is subject to more competition when it shares a hemifield 
with non-targets than when it is alone in a hemifield. More competition means a degraded 
representation, increasing search difficulty and thus reaction times. In Experiments 2 and 3, we 
wanted to replicate and extend this finding, while addressing potential concerns with Experiment 
1. One concern about Experiment 1 is that the objects used are irregularly shaped, and thus the 
distances between objects vary slightly across trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, we addressed this 
concern by using uniformly-sized objects. We also switched from the discrimination task used in 
Experiment 1 to a difficult target present/absent detection task. One of the key predictions of the 
competition model is that differential performance in hemifield conditions is due to differential 
amounts of target information and not to differences in response thresholds or biases. While the 
increased search times found in Experiment 1 are consistent with this prediction, we more 
directly tested this prediction in Experiments 2 and 3 by reporting d’. The present/absent task 
was used to accommodate a d’ measure. In particular, the task, which we adapted from 
VanRullen, Reddy, & Fei-Fei (2005), was to detect an upright face among inverted faces.
Experiment 2 is a replication of the high density condition of Experiment 1. Using the 
same hemifield conditions, we asked whether the target would be less detectable when it shared a 
hemifield with non-targets.
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3.1 Methods
Participants
We used the same sample size as Experiment 1 since the key test, whether there was 
greater hemifield independence when density was high, had high post-hoc power (.82). Twelve 
volunteers were recruited from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. All twelve gave 
informed consent and reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
The same apparatus was used as in Experiment 1. Only one image was used as a stimulus 
and was taken from a publically available database (Minear & Park, 2004). The image was a 
square cutout of a grayscale Caucasian female face subtending 1.5° x 1.5° of visual angle. 
Participants saw a black dot at fixation on a middle gray screen for 300 - 500 ms. Four copies of 
the image were then displayed for 120 ms, followed by a 500 ms display of phase-scrambled 
versions of the image that were used as masks. On half of the trials, all four faces appeared 
upside down. On the other half of trials, three faces appeared upside down and a single face, the 
target, was upright. Participants were instructed to indicate via keypress whether or not an 
upright face appeared on the trial, and to prioritize accuracy. Trials without responses were 
terminated after 2500 ms and marked incorrect. Participants completed 4 blocks of 32 trials.
The stimuli placement was identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: the 
target was centered 5° from fixation and 2° from the non-targets. As in Experiment 1, the images 
were positioned close enough together that we expected the target to strongly compete with the 
non-targets when it shared a hemifield with them. In Experiment 1, we saw evidence that 
competition increased the time needed to identify a target. We think this occurred because 
participants needed time to deploy attention to bias the competition and successfully recover 
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information about the target (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Torralbo & Beck, 2008). By reducing 
exposure time and including a mask in this experiment, we limited participants’ ability to deploy 
attention and recover target information. We therefore expected the hemifield manipulation to 
cause differences in detection sensitivity (d’), with participants better able to detect the upright 
face when it appeared alone in a hemifield than when it shared a hemifield with non-targets.
3.2 Results and Discussion
Detection sensitivity rates (d’) were calculated for each participant in both hemifield 
conditions (Figure 4). Since the display was identical on target absent trials, we used participant-
level false alarm rates to compute sensitivity. A two-tailed, paired-samples t-test revealed that 
performance was better when targets appeared alone in a hemifield (M = .967, SD = .726 ) than 
when targets shared a hemifield with non-targets (M = .611, SD = .508), t(11) = 3.413, p = .006, 
95% CI [.127, .586], Cohen’s dz = .985. This result replicates the high-density hemifield 
independence found in Experiment 1, and is consistent with our claim that differential target 
information might be the underlying cause.
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the finding in Experiment 1 of improved 
performance when targets appear alone in a hemifield relative to when they share a hemifield 
with non-targets (hemifield independence). Importantly, the improved performance in 
Experiment 2 comes in the form of detection sensitivity, consistent with the idea that differential 
target information is the crucial difference.
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4. Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we tested an implication of the competition model concerning the effect 
of exogenous spatial cues on hemifield independence. Exogenous spatial cues direct attention to 
the cued location, thereby enhancing processing for stimuli that appear in that location for a short 
time afterward (Vecera & Rizzo, 2003). Thus, we predicted that cueing a target among non-
target competitors would enhance processing for the target and reduce the competitive effects 
that the non-targets would have on the target absent such a cue. If competition is an important 
cause of hemifield independence, cueing should therefore reduce or eliminate hemifield 
independence. Specifically, we predicted that valid spatial pre-cues would increase processing at 
target locations, boosting the representation of the target when it appeared.  This should bias the 
competition between targets and non-targets such that the target “wins out” and the suppressive 
effects of the non-targets are reduced or eliminated. In contrast, invalid spatial-cues direct 
attention away from the target location and thus do not give targets the boost they need to avoid 
suppression by non-targets. According to the competition model, we should only find hemifield 
independence when the target is invalidly cued because valid cues reduce or eliminate the 
differences in competition between hemifield conditions. As in Experiment 1, neither the 
resource model nor the attentional-control model provide theoretically-based reasons to predict a 
reduction in hemifield independence due to valid cues, they can both be made consistent with 
such an effect (as will be discussed below).
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4.1 Methods
Participants
After completing Experiment 2, the same twelve subjects completed Experiment 3.
Apparatus, Stimuli, & Procedure
The same apparatus was used as in the prior experiments. The stimuli and procedure were 
identical to Experiment 1 except for the inclusion of a spatial pre-cue between the fixation and 
the stimuli displays. The pre-cue was a black outline of a square that subtended 2.1° x 2.1°. The 
cue appeared for 100 ms after the offset of fixation (fixation appeared for between 200 ms and 
500 ms), disappearing as the stimulus screen appeared. Participants completed 8 blocks of 32 
trials. On 70% of trials, the cue was centered exactly where the target would be centered on the 
stimulus screen (validly cued trials). On the remaining 30% of trials, the cue appeared in the 
visual field (upper or lower) opposite to where the target would appear on that trial (invalidly 
cued trials). The cue appeared equally often in the left and right visual fields. The invalid cues 
always appeared in a location where targets could appear.
4.2 Results and Discussion
Sensitivity rates (d’) were calculated for each participant in each combination of 
hemifield and cue conditions (Figure 5). We again operationalized hemifield independence by 
calculating the benefit in performance due to a target appearing alone in a hemifield versus it 
sharing a hemifield with non-targets. We had one main prediction: we should find greater 
hemifield independence in the invalid condition than in the valid condition. We again 
investigated this prediction with three two-tailed, within-subjects t-tests, using a sequential 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
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Both the competition and the attentional-control models predict that we should find 
hemifield independence when attention is invalidly cued, such that targets that appear alone in a 
hemifield are more detectable than targets that share a hemifield with non-targets. When 
attention was invalidly cued, performance was indeed better when the target was alone in a 
hemifield (M = 1.399, SD = .809) than when it shared a hemifield with non-targets (M = .959, 
SD = .805), t(11) = 4.415, p = .001, 95% CI [.221, .659], Cohen’s dz = 1.274. This result was 
significant at the corrected alpha threshold of .05. Sensitivity rates were in general higher in 
Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2, likely due to the fact that participants completed Experiment 
2 before completing Experiment 3.
The competition model predicts greater hemifield independence when attention is 
invalidly cued than when it is validly cued. In line with this, we found greater hemifield 
independence when participants were invalidly cued (M = .440, SD = .345) than when they were 
validly cued (M = -.013, SD = .431), t(11) = 3.107, p = .01, 95% CI [.132, .773], Cohen’s dz = 
.897. This result was significant at the corrected alpha threshold of .025. 
Lastly, we did not find any evidence of hemifield independence in the valid condition. 
Performance was not better when the target was alone in a hemifield (M = 1.616, SD = .613) 
than when it shared a hemifield with non-targets (M = 1.629, SD = .969 ms), t(11) = -.104, p = 
.919, 95% CI [-.287, .261], Cohen’s dz = -.03. This result was not significant at the corrected 
alpha threshold of .017.
These results are consistent with the competition model: we only found hemifield 
independence when attention was unable to ameliorate the suppressive effects of the non-targets. 
When attention was invalidly cued, the within-hemifield non-targets interfered with the target, 
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rendering it less detectable. However, hemifield independence was eliminated when attention 
was directed to the target location and able to reduce the suppressive effects of the non-targets.
While the competition model predicts these results a priori, it is also possible to augment 
both the resource and attentional-control models to account for these results. It might be possible 
that cueing a location prioritizes the allocation of resources, and thus the processing of stimuli, at 
that location. If a target at a cued location is processed before non-targets at uncued locations, 
this might explain a reduction of interference from non-targets. However, it is difficult to square 
this possibility with the claim of some resource models (e.g., Lavie, 1995) that selective 
processing occurs only because of capacity exhaustion (that capacity exhaustion explains 
selection). Alternatively, cueing a location might increase either the amount of resources 
deployed to that location or the ease of deploying such resources, thus reducing the amount of 
leftover resources available to process non-targets. While this might explain why cueing reduces 
the deleterious effects of non-targets on performance, it does not explain why separating targets 
and non-targets into different hemifields also improves performance.
The attentional-control model might also be able to account for these results. When a 
target in a certain hemifield is validly cued the control processes that deploy attention to that 
hemifield could prioritize processing of the target, thus reducing the effects of non-targets on 
performance. This would explain why cueing the target reduces hemifield independence. Further, 
since these control processes are thought to be lateralized, the attentional-control model can also 
explain why we find evidence of hemifield independence when targets are invalidly cued.
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5. General Discussion
The above results provide evidence that hemifield independence may be a special case of 
a well-known cortical mechanism: competition between representations in visual cortex. In 
Experiment 1, we used a visual search task to show that separating task-relevant objects within a 
hemifield improved performance similarly to separating them across hemifields. Performance 
improved when the cortical distance between objects was sufficient to alleviate competition, 
regardless of whether the separation was within or between hemifields. Thus, the factor limiting 
behavioral performance here might be competition between object representations and not 
hemifield-level availability of processing resources or limitations in the ability to coordinate 
within-hemifield deployment of attention. 
However, it is possible for both the resource as implementation model and the attentional-
control model to account for this data. If resources are conceptualized as localized to a scale 
smaller than the entire brain or a single hemifield, then local display density could interact with 
resources. Specifically, behavioral performance should be worse when multiple stimuli fall 
within a section of the brain where neurons all share resources than when the same stimuli are 
spread across sections of the brain where neurons do not share resources. A similar argument 
could be made for the attentional-control model: performance will suffer when stimuli fall inside 
a section of the brain where the coordination of attentional deployment for a single stimulus is 
not independent of the coordination for the other items. Experiment 1 (as well as Experiment 2) 
thus suggests that the locus of the attentional bottleneck in hemifield independence may not be at 
the level of the hemifield, but rather at the level of more localized processes.
In Experiment 2, we extended the hemifield independence effect from Experiment 1 to a 
detection task to show, as predicted by the competition model, that sensitivity to the target (and 
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not simply response bias) is responsible for hemifield independence. A similar prediction could 
also be made by a resource model if one assumes that the resource in question facilitates the 
processing of perceptual information and not just the facilitation of response selection. Similarly, 
the attentional control model could also make this prediction provided that attention is necessary 
to extract/construct perceptual information.
In Experiment 3, we used exogenous spatial cues to manipulate the ability of attention to 
resolve competition. Exogenous spatial cues have been shown to increase both the P1 ERP 
component (Doalla, Lorenzo-Lopez, Vizoso, Holguı́n, Amenedo, Bara, & Cadaveira, 2004) and 
behaviorally-measured contrast sensitivity (Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004; Pestilli & Carrasco, 
2005) at cued locations. These results indicate that exogenous spatial cues improve the 
representation of a target at the cued location, making the target more likely to “win” when it 
competes with non-targets (Carandini & Heeger, 2004, Reynolds & Heeger, 2009). When targets 
were invalidly cued, attention seemed unable to effectively bias the competition between the 
target and non-targets. As predicted by the competition model, we found hemifield independence 
in this case: performance was better when objects appeared alone in a hemifield than when they 
shared a hemifield with non-targets. However, when validly cued, attention could effectively 
bias the competition, reducing the suppressive influences of the non-targets. In accord with the 
competition model, we did not find hemifield independence in this case. 
We think Experiment 3 also suggests a reinterpretation of past data. While Alvarez & 
Cavanagh (2005) consider perceptual interference (competition) as an explanation for hemifield 
independence, one of the reasons they reject an interference account is that they find large 
performance differences across physically identical displays by simply manipulating the number 
of objects that people needed to track. For instance, when two objects are placed in a single 
25
hemifield, participants are better at tracking a single object than they are at tracking two objects. 
Since the two tracking conditions are physically identical, they conclude that perceptual 
interference must also be identical across them and so cannot explain the differences in 
performance. We have a different interpretation. As in Experiment 3, and the neural work 
referenced above, when attention is directed to a target among non-targets, the suppressive 
influence of the non-targets is reduced and the representation of the target is improved, thus 
improving performance. Said differently, top-down attentional processes feedback into early 
visual cortex, select the target, and alter the perceptual interference between objects such that the 
target representation improves and its competitors’ representations are suppressed. Thus, even 
though two conditions may contain physically identical displays, attentional manipulations can 
alter the perceptual interference (competition) between objects.
This last point is one of general importance for cognitive theories of attention. If 
resolving perceptual competition is of the main functions of attention, as researchers have argued 
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastner et al., 1998; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001), it is possible 
that many bottlenecks which appear to be attentional (because they are modulated by attentional 
manipulations) are actually perceptual. This means that some capacity limits may not be due to 
lack of attention (as both the resource and attentional-control models claim about hemifield 
independence), but rather due to an inability to successfully boost a target from the suppressive 
effects of its competitors. For instance, Scalf & Beck (2010) had participants in an fMRI view 
displays containing a group of three densely-arranged objects. Participants either attended one of 
the objects, all three of them, or an entirely separate group of objects (attending away). 
Measuring from a contralateral ROI in V4 corresponding to the location of the object in the 
attend one condition, they found that attending to just that one object increased BOLD activity 
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relative to both attending away and attending to all three objects. Importantly this was observed 
in a visual area, as opposed to an attention control region, consistent with the idea that attention 
changes perceptual information and reduces competition. 
Interestingly, Scalf & Beck also found that attending to all three items actually led to 
slightly less BOLD activity than when attention was directed away from the objects, implying 
that attending to a number of competing objects did not improve their representations in cortex 
relative to when those items were unattended. In a separate but similar study, Scalf & Beck 
(2011) also found that attention only reduces the amount of suppression an object receives from 
its competitors (relative to when attention is diverted away) when it is the only object attended. 
Taken together, these findings imply that attention is not a cure all for capacity limits: if multiple 
objects are suppressing one another, attending to them all may simply boost their ability to 
suppress one another rather than improve their representations. Crucially, even though the target 
(along with its competitors) is now being attended, its representation may be just as poor as when 
it was unattended.
While we have been talking about the competition and resources as implementation 
models as though they are mutually exclusive, the same is not true for the competition model and 
resources as functional explanation. As mentioned, resources can be understood as something 
like a functional explanation of behavioral regularities: performance, in general, drops when 
people have to simultaneously process multiple stimuli. While we have argued against 
understanding resources as an implementational story, there is a real sense in which we think of 
competition as the neural implementation of something like a functional level resource.: 
performance, in general, drops when multiple representations crowd together into the same area 
of cortex. This is resource-like in that there is a limit to the amount of stuff we can process at 
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once. Further, the resource metaphor affords predictions that turn out to be true: for instance, 
reducing the number of objects we need to simultaneously process, in general, improves 
performance. However, as is true for most abstract models of cognition, things get complicated 
once we start looking at the implementational details. We have argued that resource models are 
hard to square with what we know about the brain. We have also suggested that resources as 
implementation does not do enough explanatory work. Why are objects harder to see when they 
are close together? Why do similar objects interfere with one another more than dissimilar 
objects? Why are objects in two hemispheres easier to process than objects in a single 
hemisphere? The resource metaphor does not explain these phenomena so much as it chalks up 
the observed differences to different levels of required resources. Again, the concern is that a 
resource might just be a synonym for difficulty.
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that some capacity limits can arise from 
bottlenecks at levels lower than the hemifield (perhaps local interactions in visual cortex). These 
experiments also suggest that the hemifield-level bottlenecks observed in hemifield 
independence might in fact result from such lower level bottlenecks. The attentional-control 
model, as currently specified, attributes hemifield independence to hemifield-level bottlenecks 
and thus has trouble accounting for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. We have suggested 
ways to modify the attentional-control to account for these experiments: positing more localized 
attentional coordination zones. For instance, there could be regions of the brain smaller than the 
hemisphere where, if multiple stimuli fell in this region, the coordination of attention to one 
stimulus in that region would not be independent of the coordination of attention to another 
stimulus in that region. This would allow multiple levels of coordination bottlenecks and should 
predict graded levels of at different levels of the visual hierarchy. Furthermore, to be clear, while 
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we have argued for a locus of interference in hemifield independence at the level of visual 
cortex, we do not discount the possibility that attentional control bottlenecks at the level of the 
hemifield are important factors that limit visual processing. However, at present there exists 
precious little evidence that attentional control bottlenecks constrain hemifield-level processing 
in such a way as to explain hemifield independence. Further, the attentional-control model, like 
the resource model, explains hemifield independence as arising from the inability to attend to 
multiple stimuli in the same hemifield as effectively as one can attend to multiple stimuli in 
different hemifields. In other words, both models claim that a lack of attention is responsible for 
hemifield independence. The implication is that multiple stimuli presented unilaterally receive 
less attention than when the same stimuli are presented bilaterally, and that this differential 
amount of attention explains hemifield independence. We have seen, however, that more 
attention is not always the answer (Scalf & Beck, 2010), and we propose that hemifield 
independence may instead result from perceptual interference rather than attentional exhaustion.
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6.  Figures and Table
Figure 1:  Example displays and conditions for Experiment 1. Top left: the target (here a dog) is alone in a 
hemifield and the overall display density is low. Top right: the target (here a bird) shares a hemifield with non-
targets and the overall display density is low. Bottom left: the target (here a bird) is alone in a hemifield and the 
overall display density is high. Bottom right: the target (here a dog) shares a hemifield with non-targets and the 
overall display density is high.
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Figure 2: Violin plots of the results from Experiment 1. Hemifield independence is here operationalized as the 
difference between when a target shared a hemifield with non-targets (shared) and when the target appeared alone in 
a hemifield (alone). There is more hemifield independence (Alone - Shared) when the displays were Dense than 
when displays were Sparse. White bars represent mean and 95% CI.
Table 1: Accuracies and standard errors for Experiment 1.
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Figure 3:  Example displays and conditions from Experiment 2. Left: The target (the upright face) is alone in a 
hemifield. Right: The target (the upright face) shares a hemifield with non-targets. 
Figure 4: Violin plots of the results from Experiment 2. Participants were better at detecting the target when it 
appeared along in a hemifield than when it shared a hemifield with non-targets. White bars represent mean and 95% 
CI.
32
Figure 5: Violin plots of the results from Experiment 3. Hemifield independence is here operationalized as the 
difference between when a target appeared alone in a hemifield (Alone) and when a target shared a hemifield with 
non-targets (Shared). There is more hemifield independence (Shared - Alone) when the target was invalidly cued 
(Invalid) than when it was validly cued (Valid). There was hemifield independence when the target was invalidly 
cued (Invalid) and no evidence of hemifield independence when the target was validly cued (Valid). White bars 
represent mean and 95% CI.
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